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By the time this review is published, Tony Blair will no longer be Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom. He pushed for a decision to be taken by the next general election: he wanted the UK to 
commit to replacing the current Trident system (a stock of 58 missiles and under 200 warheads, 
some of these housed on four nuclear submarines) with a new generation of nuclear weapons and 
submarines. The British Trident submarines are scheduled for retirement between 2019 and 
2024, and the warheads have a limited lifespan as well. Although options existed for extending 
the current system up to 2051, the House of Commons voted in March 2007 by a strong margin 
to spend at least £20 billion to replace Trident. However, 88 Labour MPs defected from the vote, 
which was characterised as a strong blow to Blair’s leadership. 
 
The looming decision on Trident prompted the writing of this book. The editors aim to 
contribute to the public conversation on this matter. Whatever the merits of the book, it is to be 
hoped that it played a role in promoting and will still play a role in informing the public 
conversation, and it is well suited to do so. (Is there still a conversation to be had? Foreign 
Secretary Margaret Beckett said at the time that the decision was ‘not irreversible.’) A project of 
the Council on Christian Approaches to Defence and Disarmament, the volume is edited by 
Brian Wicker and Hugh Beach, who are chair and vice-chair, respectively, of the organisation. 
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They bring together contributors of both religious and secular mindset, most all of them active in 
research and advocacy on nuclear policy. Some, including co-editor Beach, had careers in the 
British military; some have held in public posts concerning defence policy. The authors represent 
a range of policy positions: from nuclear-pacifism (Tony Kempster’s title proclaims, ‘The Bomb 
is Not a Holy Weapon of Peace!’) to realism (Oliver Kamm leads with, ‘If Our Enemies Have 
Nuclear Weapons, So Must We.’) Most of the contributors take up positions between these 
poles, and most are moderately to severely critical of the Blair plan. 
 
Each of the thirteen essays is readable, concise, and possesses its own merits. The editors 
add two valuable features. The first is an excellent introduction that summarizes the shape and 
status of the conversation created by thirteen essays. This introduction identifies nine ‘points of 
consensus’ among the contributors and fourteen ‘bones of contention,’ the latter divided into 
ethical, political, legal, technical/strategic, and theological issues. Among the consensus points 
are that the rationale for Britain’s deterrent is up for question after the end of the Cold War, that 
its deterrent is of no use against terrorist groups, and that updating the arsenal could well 
undermine the cause of non-proliferation. The bones of contention include well-worn ethical 
issues in the nuclear deterrence debate. Of particular interest is how the collection as a whole 
interweaves the ethical issues with political and strategic debates over whether Britain really still 
‘needs’ a nuclear deterrent and what benefits and risks would accrue to a decision to let the 
nuclear programme expire. 
 
The second beneficial feature of the book is a ‘Technical Annex’ by Hugh Beach. This 
twenty-page appendix explains the basic facts that are publicly known about Britain’s nuclear 
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programme. Also discussed here is the dependence of the Trident system on the United States. It 
is not clear that a Trident missile could be launched and effectively targeted without U.S. 
approval and support, although Beach concludes is possible. However, ‘the whole system would 
start to become unworkable and probably unsafe within a matter of a year or so’ (191).  
 
There are three potential audiences for this book. The first, naturally, comprises church 
members and others involved in theological conversations about the ethics of war and peace, 
especially in the UK. The description on the back cover aims the book at ‘every Christian 
concerned about the action of the current government in relation to the future defence of the 
country.’ This audience will find much of value within, though little of it explicitly theological. 
Only Bishop Richard Harries addresses some theological foundations for his just-war based 
acceptance of nuclear deterrence. A few of the contributors who strongly favour disarmament 
appear to be motivated by faith and religious teaching, but the connections are not explicitly 
drawn. This indirect role for religion might be expected in a debate on an applied ethical issue; 
and it might be bemoaned or celebrated or simply noticed—that is a matter for another 
discussion. The second audience is all citizens of the UK who are interested in the same ‘actions 
of the current government.’ Of course, shouldn’t everyone be concerned? While no civic 
population shows universal interest in any policy issue, it is possible that the high dismay in the 
UK over the Iraq War will translate into heightened interest in the decision about renewing 
Trident. At the moment, the decision to renew Trident has majority public support, but advocates 
for the options of ending or reducing the programme can find considerable and well-framed 
arguments in this book.  
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The third audience is readers outside the United Kingdom, likely in church and academic 
contexts. For that audience, of which this reviewer is a member, the book is not only informative 
about the momentous British decision, it is illuminating about Britain’s perception of its role in 
the world. The contributors represent two main ways of thinking: Britain should retain its role as 
a major military power by replacing Trident, or it should take a leading role in non-proliferation 
and de-proliferation by forsaking what is already a costly and unnecessary deterrent. As an 
American reader, I was struck by the dependence of the British deterrent on American technical 
support and left dubious that the UK is able to act as a truly independent nuclear power. I was 
also persuaded that Britain stands at a crossroads at which it could exert unique global leadership 
by moving in a direction other than replacing Trident. 
 
Will this book be relevant beyond the March 2007 vote and Blair’s stepping down? Yes, 
because it lays out balanced and edifying debate. The book should retain value as the British 
populace and leadership analyze how and why the decision was taken and whether they want to 
stick by it. It also sheds critical light on the tropes that other nuclear powers and nuclear-jealous 
powers state in support of their policies. If even the modest ‘points of consensus’ identified by 
editors were more broadly acknowledged in the political debates about nuclear weapons, the 
international community might see some progress toward non-proliferation. 
